This paper formalizes a widely discussed peer e¤ect entitled 'acting white'. 'Acting White'is modeled as a two audience signaling quandary: signals that induce high wages can be signals that induce peer group rejection. Without peer e¤ects, equilibria involve all ability types choosing di¤erent levels of education. 'Acting White'alters the equilibrium dramatically: the (possibly 
the ongoing puzzle of black underachievement. 5 The key idea is that individuals face a two audience signaling quandary: behaviors that promote labor market success are behaviors that induce peer rejection. The model involves an environment with three sorts of agents: individuals, …rms, and a (suitably anthropomorphized) peer group. Individuals are endowed with a two-dimensional type: social and economic. The social type represents their value to the group and the economic type their value in the economic market. Individuals are also endowed with a unit of time to be allocated between schooling and leisure. After observing their two-dimensional type, individuals choose a fraction of time to devote to education which serves as a signal to …rms about future productivity and to peers about social compatibility. Upon observing individual investments in education, the group decides whether or not to accept the individual and wages are set by …rms who engage in Bertrand bidding to produce a homogeneous product. 6 It is important to emphasize at the outset that, in the model, …rms are assumed to have no interest in any employee's group membership, and groups are assumed not to have any basic preference over whether a potential member works hard at school, is employed or wealthy. 7 Consequently, there is no intrinsic con ‡ict built into the model between individuals being highly educated and employed, and being members of a group; to the extent that such con ‡ict emerges, therefore, it is as an equilibrium consequence of two-audience signaling. At the same time, other things equal, all social types strictly prefer to be accepted rather than rejected by their peer group. And, just as group acceptance is valuable to the individual, individuals yield value to the group through consumption externalities, community policing, so on and so forth. Peer groups, however, only 5 There are many of other explanations put forth to explain racial di¤erences in achievement, which range from the genetic inferiority of minorities [Jensen 1998 and Rushton 2000 ] to di¤erences in neighborhoods and environment [Brooks-Gunn and Duncan, 1997]. All of these explanations fail on some dimension. The genetics argument runs in direct con ‡ict with the substantial amount of biological evidence that fails to pin any di¤erence in the biological taxonomy of human beings to race [Olson 2002 and Sykes 2002] . Environmental explanations do not account for the empirical observation that blacks still do substantially worse than whites in middle class suburban neighborhoods, where presumably the social and …nancial constructs are very similar [Ferguson 2001 and . 6 Several features of this framework are quite consistent with the motivation of recent work on optimal parochialism [Bowles and Gintis 2004] and identity [Akerlof and Kranton 2000] . Inter alia, these authors survey a litany of works, both academic and autobiographical, testifying to the tension many individuals of a minority culture feel between doing what is expected to remain accepted by their peers or social group (be it predicated on race, ethnicity, gender, or other network a¢ liation), and doing what is expected to succeed in a world dominated by those in the majority culture. 7 This is an important point of departure from the standard explanations in the sociology and anthropology literatures.
want to accept members who are socially compatible group members in that they can be depended upon to support the group in di¢ cult times. Examples are not hard to …nd; they range from gang members who can be trusted not to betray other members when subjected to police investigation, to residents of a community who can be relied upon to invest the time and e¤ort to help their neighbors when they are in need [see Anderson 1990 and , for more detailed examples]. 8 We establish three central results for equilibrium behavior satisfying a standard belief-based re…nement. First, when either element of an individual's type (social or economic) is common knowledge, the equilibria of the model involve complete separation; all ability types choose distinctive levels of educational investment and only those with high social value are accepted. Second, when both elements of an individual's type are private information, no equilibria exist in which all types adopt distinct education choices; all equilibria must involve some pooling. Third and most interesting, equilibria involve a partition of individual economic abilities into at most three intervals: a (possibly empty) set of the lowest ability types and the set of highest ability types reveal themselves through a separating education strategy; ability types in the middle interval pool on a common education level. Only types in the lower intervals are accepted by the group. It is worth emphasizing that nothing is built into the model that requires accepted types to adopt a common educational investment; it is an equilibrium outcome. This partition produces novel predictions as one varies the wage structure, group size and value of membership, and the types of social interactions involved. The ability of the boundary types are strictly increasing in the value of group membership, which is likely higher in places with more racial segregation. Similarly, as the opportunity cost of group membership increases, the marginal ability types strictly decrease and the pooling level of education among the accepted types decreases. Ironically then, in environments in which 'acting white'is salient, improved external labor markets have the e¤ect of encouraging more individuals to leave the group, while causing those in the group to invest less in education. 8 An important characteristic of these and many other examples, one that in large part de…nes what it is to be a member of social group rather than a strictly economic market, is that the costs of membership are in terms of personal time and e¤ort, not money per se. Although the assumption that all individuals prefer to be accepted by their peers is taken as primitive (and predicated on the sociological and psychological evidence that such preferences exist and are widespread [Freedman, Carlsmith, and Sears 1970] , the operationalization of which combinations of social and economic types constitute acceptable group members is endogenous to the model, giving rise naturally to a notion of peer pressure.
II. CONFLICTING EVIDENCE ON 'ACTING WHITE'
The notion that blacks view a set of distinctive behaviors (upward mobility, particular speech patterns, acquiescence to white authority) as "selling out," "acting white," or "Tomism" can be traced (at least) to the well-documented strife between house and …eld Negroes in everyday plantation life, and seems to have taken hold by the advent of the Black Power movement in the late 1960's. 9 For instance, Van Deburg [1992] reports popular black literary artists depicting "Toms"
having their tongues cut out for talking like white people. More recently, there has been a renewed interest in the idea as a plausible explanation of black-white di¤erences in educational achievement.
This is due, in part, to Fordham and Ogbu [1986] and Fordham [1996] who argue for the prevalence of an oppositional culture among black youth that eschew behaviors traditionally seen as the prerogative for whites. 10 Their hypothesis states that the observed disparity between blacks and whites stems from the following factors: (1) white people provide them with inferior schooling and treat them di¤erently in school; (2) by imposing a job ceiling, white people fail to reward them adequately for their academic achievement in adult life; and (3) black Americans develop coping devices which, in turn, further limit their striving for academic success. 11 This dilemma between racial authenticity and achievement has been documented in many ethnographies and the popular media, though there is no consensus. 12 There is an apparent con ‡ict between the ethnographic evidence on 'acting white'and nationally 9 A (suitably modi…ed) version of 'acting white'is also prevalent in ethnographies involving the Buraku Outcastes In what follows, we present a simple and stylized model of peer pressure that abstracts from all but the bare essentials necessary to illustrate the motivating ideas. 16 The key innovation is that an individual's educational investment is a signal, both to potential employers about the individual's productivity and to peers about the individuals social compatibility. Further, while employers are free to adjust wages continuously in an individual's signaled productivity, the peer group simply makes a binary decision regarding whether the individual is deemed acceptable or not.
So, although it is assumed that employers have no direct interest in the individual's social status and that peers have no direct interests in the individual's productivity, the equilibrium consequence of two-audience signaling with a common decision is that a subset of productive types underinvest in education relative to the situation without any peers to impress. The following model captures this intuition.
III.A. Agents and actions
Consider three sets of agents: individuals, …rms, and a (suitably anthropomorphized) peer
group. An individual's type is a pair, = ( ; ) 2 fh; lg [ ; 1) with > 1 and h > l > 0.
Each component of an individual's type is private information to the individual and assumed to be independently drawn. Let p(h) be the probability that = h and assume that is chosen according to a smooth cumulative distribution function (CDF) F with density having full support 1 5 It is important to also emphasize that the e¤ects of 'acting white' reach far beyond investments in education.
For example, it is likely to be salient in the production of informal associations, friendships, network a¢ liations, and other social relationships individuals obtain. These variables are highly correlated with economic success [see Firms have no interest in any individual beyond his or her capacity as an employee; they neither observe nor care about an individual's social type or whether he or she belongs to a group. Firms choose wage-o¤ers to maximize expected pro…t. And, the wage paid in equilibrium to an employee, (s; ); under complete information on is w(s; ). Under incomplete information on ; however, education can serve as a signal of economic type. The wage o¤ered to any potential employee is that individual's expected marginal product conditional on his or her observed education level and the educational investment strategy.
We are not interested here in details of the equilibrium wage-o¤er schedule. As such, from this point forward, we simply assume that individuals are paid a wage equal (in equilibrium) to their expected marginal product as just described and, where appropriate, specify the …rms'responses to any out-of-equilibrium action by an individual.
To this point, the setup essentially describes a canonical Spence signaling model; we now introduce a variation through the social component of individual types. The key innovation is that an individual's educational choice problem is in ‡uenced by his or her peer group. Other things equal, being an accepted member of the group is assumed to be valued by all types. Assume that the value of leisure to an accepted individual with education s is given by (1 + )(1 s), whereas the value of leisure if individual is rejected by the group is simply (1 s). The payo¤ to of choosing education s and receiving wage w is The (unitary actor) peer group has no direct interest in an individual's economic potential. 18 Rather, the group is interested in accepting individuals whose social value to the group is su¢ ciently high, where social type and economic type are uncorrelated in the model. This is a crucial di¤erence between an economic approach to understanding 'acting white' and that used in sociology and cultural anthropology. In the latter, groups are assumed to have preferences which are oppositional toward economic success (Fordham and Ogbu [1986] ).
Let the group's value from an individual of social type be v( ) and assume l is su¢ ciently low that v(l) = 0 < v(h) = 1 for all s > 0. Assume further that the group's payo¤ from rejecting any individual is …xed,v 2 (0; 1). 19 The group is only interested in accepting "high" social types and has no direct concern with such types'educational levels. On the other hand, an individual's choice of education in principle conveys information to the group regarding the individual's social type.
Putting the pieces together, individuals …rst choose their education according to a strategy To insure the group has a nontrivial problem, assume the prior that any individual is a high social type, p(h), is strictly less thanv and that the di¤erence between the high and the low social types is non-negligible. 20 It is important to note that any racial or ethnic di¤erences in the relationship between achievement and social acceptance comes throughv:
We are interested in how the desire to be accepted by one's peer group, albeit modeled in the minimal fashion described above, in ‡uences an individual's choice of education. The solution concept, much-used for analyzing costly signaling games, is the D1 re…nement of sequential equilibrium [Banks and Sobel, 1987; Cho and Kreps, 1987; Cho and Sobel 1990] , suitably extended to cover our two-audience setting. It is well-known that there is a unique D1 equilibrium in the canonical educational signaling game without a group; all types separate with education strictly increasing in type, and …rms pay individuals their true marginal product [Riley 1979 ]. Moreover, to avoid lower types mimicking higher types, the separating strategy requires all but the lowest type to over-invest in education relative to their complete information utility-maximizing choice.
In our model, however, an individual's type consists of two independent components, social and economic, and there are two distinct agents separately interested in these components. Extending the D1 re…nement to our setting is straightforward. First, by de…nition of a sequential equilibrium, …rms and the group all form out-of-equilibrium beliefs identically. Second, these uninformed agents form their beliefs consequent on an out-of-equilibrium message by identifying those types having the most incentive (in a set-inclusion sense) to o¤er the deviation, conditional on the uninformed agents'best-responding to these beliefs, where the identi…cation of the types having most to gain from any deviation requires consideration of both components of an individual's type, . 21 2 0 Exactly what this means is made precise in the next section. 2 1 More precisely, suppose that, for all responses by the group and the …rms, whenever some type is weakly better o¤ relative to his or her equilibrium payo¤ by choosing a particular out-of-equilibrium action s, then a type 0 is strictly better o¤ choosing s. Then D1 requires that both the group and the …rms assign zero probability to the deviant being type rather than type 0 .
III.B. ' Acting white'equilibrium
It is immediate from the assumptions on the utility of leisure and the cost function c, that no type ever chooses the maximum available education level, s = 1; thus (1 s) > 0 in any equilibrium with or without complete information. In particular, if there is complete information on , individuals are paid a wage w = w(s; ) and (3) implies that for all and all s 2 [0; 1],
Also, u(w; ; s; ) is strictly concave in s with utility maximizing education level s c ( ). The …rst order condition de…ning an interior level of education s c ( ) is
It is convenient (but not essential) to normalize types so that
Then, given complete information and 2 f0; 1g, we have s c 1 ( ; h) = 0 < s c 1 ( ; l) and, for all > and all ,
We suppose throughout that the di¤erence between the high and the low social type is su¢ ciently large that an individual of type ( ; l) prefers to be rejected by the group with income w = s c 0 ( ) to being accepted by the group with no income; speci…cally, assume or, equivalently,
It is useful to consider two benchmark cases. In the …rst, social types are common knowledge but economic types are private information. Then only high social types are accepted by the peer group in equilibrium and the unique D1 equilibrium involves all economic types separating according to the Riley strategy; that is, is strictly increasing in with ( ; l) = s c 0 ( ), ( ; h) = s c 1 ( ; h) and, for all > , ( ; ) > s c ( ; ). Moreover, low social types invest strictly more in education than high types. See Figure I .
Figure I here
Note that while there can be two distinct economic types choosing a given level of education in the equilibrium, the fact that social type is common knowledge permits …rms to separate these economic types and pay each their respective marginal products.
The second benchmark has economic types common knowledge and social types private information. In this case, there exists a D1 equilibrium separating in social types. Thats( ) exists follows from (8), concavity and continuity of (full information) payo¤s in education.
Say that an education strategy is separating in on an interval I if, for all and all distinct economic types ; 0 in I, ( ; ) 6 = ( 0 ; ). The following proposition states our main result. Comparing Proposition II to the two benchmark cases, it is clear that the con ‡icting incentives induced by signaling to two audiences leads to underinvestment in education among low and moderate economic types. Low social types are always rejected by the group and invest appropriately (that is, they overinvest to separate themselves in economic type); high social types, however, can underinvest signi…cantly to insure group acceptance. For su¢ ciently able economic types, the opportunity cost of group acceptance becomes excessive and they choose to signal economic ability to …rms rather than social type to peers. It is worth noting too, that given economic types can consistently adopt distinct education levels in equilibrium, depending on whether they are accepted by the group.
III.C. Comparative statics
Perturb the speci…cation of payo¤s slightly by letting an individual's productivity be w( ; s)
where > 0. The parameter can be interpreted either in terms of a neutral change in worker productivity (with 1) or as a discount factor (with > 0). In the latter case, we imagine educational investment and peer group activity occurs during the 'school years' but wages are earned only during the 'post-school years'. Then it is straightforward to con…rm the following comparative statics (stated without proof).
Proposition III: Let be a D1 equilibrium strategy satisfying the properties described in Proposition 2 withŝ = 0. Then, other things equal:
(I) a marginal increase in induces a fall in H and an increase in the educational achievement and wages of all rejected types;
(II) a marginal increase in h induces an increase in H .
Interpreting as a discount factor, the …rst observation states that the less individuals value the present over the future, the more attenuated peer pressure becomes. Similarly, if measures a shift in worker productivity, the observation is that an increase in the economic opportunity cost of group membership results in fewer types being willing to sacri…ce education for peer acceptance.
On the other hand, the second observation states that the greater the high social type values group acceptance relative to income, the more e¤ective is the desire to impress the group of one's social acceptability. These implications are intuitive: as the value of group acceptance increases, the ability of the boundary types ( L and H ) increase. When the maximal education level among accepted group members is not zero, there might be several triples ( H ; L ;ŝ) withŝ > 0 consistent with equilibrium behavior. In this event, the comparative statics above continue to obtain for the equilibrium with a …xedŝ. In particular, both boundary points, ( L and H ) fall with an increase in , as does the average wage of those accepted by the group relative to those rejected by the group. 22 Empirically, the value of group acceptance (as re ‡ected in ) is a function of many social variables including segregation, crime, neighborhood structure and density, and so on. In the next 2 2 Intuitively, given a …xedŝ > 0, the …rst-order impact of a marginal increase in is to shift relative wages so that H strictly prefers to separate and be rejected rather than pool onŝ and be accepted, while L strictly prefers to pool onŝ rather than separate within the group. Thus both boundary types shift downward, inducing a second-order reduction in the wage level of those choosingŝ and resulting in a fall in the average wage of those accepted by the group to those rejected.
section, we consider the implications of our results for some of the more signi…cant in ‡uences on the worth of group acceptance. Of necessity this will be more informal, as we have not explicitly derived the value of from these underlying characteristics. Before doing this, however, it is useful to note that although we have stated the comparative statics in terms of and h, similar implications apply with respect to analogous changes in the opportunity costs of group membership (for example, a change in the direct cost of acquiring education). In general, an increase in the opportunity costs of group membership has two e¤ects: an increase in the set of rejected types and a (weak) decrease in time or e¤ort allocated to education by members of the accepted group. This latter comparative static illustrates a distinct bipolarization in equilibrium behavior as a result of changes in the economic environment. 23 If the costs of being a group member increase, the marginal type eschews the group and adopts correspondingly higher education and wages, whereas those who adhere to group norms become even more marginalized. There is some suggestive evidence that this 
IV. INTERPRETING BLACK UNDERACHIEVEMENT THROUGH THE LENS OF 'ACTING WHITE'
In this section, we attempt to understand some of the patterns and paradoxes of black underachievement through the lens of the model put forth in the preceding section. The evidence is not meant prove whether or not 'acting white'is an important economic phenomenon, as most of the theoretical implications are consistent with other models of self selection. More modestly, we endeavor to show that the model's predictions are consistent with empirical facts on the decline of black neighborhoods in the 1970's, black underachievement in middle class neighborhoods, and the e¢ cacy of particular educational and job interventions.
IV.A The Rise of the Ghetto
From American Chattel slavery through Jim Crow, the value of racial solidarity and group membership was extremely high. In a typical black community, doctors, lawyers, postmen, and others with lower occupational status, lived in the same vicinity. High educated blacks were just as likely as low educated blacks to ful…l their obligations to the community. With the decrease in institutional discrimination and the increase in housing integration came many new opportunities, including the choice of opting out of the group. With this change, community monitoring of agents'educational investments became an important predictor of their group loyalty. In his classic portrayal of neighborhoods in Chicago, Wilson [1978] argues that the African American community was splitting into two, with middle class blacks increasing their position relative to whites, and poor blacks becoming even more marginalized. Wilson's conjecture is that the plight of the black inner cities was due to the erosion of their social networks and social capital. This element of self-selection is readily seen in the framework presented here, as we increase the cost of group membership. There are, however, some subtle di¤erences. Whereas Wilson argues that networks are to blame, we argue that the very presence of high ability blacks and institutional barriers gave incentives to those on the margin to invest in group membership. This observation is consistent with the …ndings involving 'acting white'in suburban schools [Fryer and Torelli 2004] . Essentially, Proposition II shows that as one increases the porosity between black and white social interactions, negative peer sanctions become more salient. Thus, our hypothesis for the erosion of inner-cities is slightly di¤erent from
Wilson [1978] . Wilson argues that the corrosion of social networks and role models are to blame.
We assert that the very presence of institutional discrimination and the lack of mobility eliminated the two-audience signaling problem and, hence, the link between education and 'acting white.'
IV.B. The Middle Class Paradox
While the acting white hypothesis may explain sub par academic performance in low-income ]. This has puzzled many, since presumably black and white children in these neighborhoods have been reared under similar conditions. To understand this paradox, one has to consider the impact of racial segregation in housing. Due to a peculiar history, the black middle class are much more likely to live in neighborhoods that border poor black neighborhoods. 24 Jargowsky and Bane [1991] show that black middle class neighborhoods are much more likely to create a bu¤er zone between the black poor and white non-poor. Massey and Denton [1993] 
IV.C. Policy Interventions
There have many attempts at closing the black-white achievement gap. Some of these interventions involve taking students out of their classroom environments and enrolling them in programs away from their communities. This usually takes one of two forms: students are removed from their community for a …xed amount of time (day, summer, etc.), or students are removed from their community permanently. Versions of the latter characterization include the Gautreaux program, a major initiative adopted by the courts to provide a metropolitan-wide remedy for racial discrimination in Chicago's public housing, Moving-to-Opportunity, Job Corps, and the A Better Chance Program. 25 In the A Better Chance initiative, students leave their families and live with a host family to attend better schools. Consider the following quote from a student in the A Better Chance Program.
"I felt I could be more involved with my studies here [in the host family]. At home, I
would be distracted by peer pressures to hang out, smoke and drink. Here, I can focus on the academics. You face peer pressure wherever you go, but at Radnor there are more kids into their studies. 26 "
Our two audience signaling model predicts that these types of interventions will have larger marginal e¤ects on students'educational achievement because they change the nature of group interactions. Other interventions induce sorting, but have an ambiguous e¤ect on the marginal student.
The available evidence suggests that this is indeed the case. Sixty-…ve percent of the students in the A Better Chance program come from single parent families and thirty-three percent of them are beneath the poverty threshold; however, ninety-nine percent of the A Better Chance seniors immediately enroll in college. This is signi…cantly larger than any other secondary educational intervention. 27 More convincing are the results from analysis of the Job Start and Job Corps programs. Job
Corps is the nation's largest and most comprehensive residential, education and job training program for at-risk youth, ages 16 through 24. It takes the students to (predominantly rural) training centers where they receive free room and board along with intense training in one of 100 vocational specializations. Conversely, Job Start uses the same teaching curricula as Job Corp, but the students stay at home and commute to a local training site. As the model would predict, Job Corps has larger e¤ects. It has been shown that Job Corp increases earnings and reduces crime, whereas, Job Start has shown statistically insigni…cant e¤ects. 28 If 'acting white'is suppressing achievement, the aim of any intervention must be geared either toward changing the nature/de…nition of group interactions or eliminating them completely -which have di¤erent implications for policy depending on which is pursued. 29 A nice test of the e¢ cacy of the latter policy would be to investigate the black-white achievement gap among military children 2 6 "Going 'Away'to School in Radnor: A Better Chance for Teens Who Put Their Schooling First."The Suburban and Wayne Times, September 23, 1999. 2 7 There are thorny selection issues to consider before one can truly test the programs causal e¤ects. 2 8 See http://www.jobcorps.org and http://www.mdrc.org/project_9_60.html for results on Job Corp and Job Start programs, respectively. 2 9 This could partially explain the anomalous results from the Moving-to-Opportunity Experiments where it was found that moving poor families to better neighborhoods had no e¤ect on achievment for girls and a modest negative e¤ect for boys (Kling, and Liebman 2004) . And, boys were more likely to be in trouble with police. If 'acting white' was salient, then these results are consistent with a model in which the youth found it neccesary to signal to their old peer group that they were worthy of acceptance.
at military schools, where presumably, racial di¤erences in the relationship between popularity and grades are minimal. The theory predicts that these gaps will be substantially smaller. As Two further points are worth emphasizing. First, 'acting white'is not unique to Blacks and we (purposefully) reference other groups plagued by similar phenomena. Second, and most important, because various insidious forms of social interaction such as 'acting white'exist does not imply that nothing can be done about them. The comparative static results (Proposition III) suggest that improved labor markets, group incentives, and means for supporting implicit community-speci…c contracts are likely to undermine acting white.
In the past, the sorts of interaction explored here have been used by some to argue that partic- The implication being that policies aimed at eradicating educational achievement di¤erences are ill-advised. In contrast, by analyzing such a phenomenon in a rational choice framework, it is transparent that the behavior is a result of strategic interaction for which any group with the same initial conditions would fall victim. As such, nothing should be ascribed to the inherent values, prefer-ences, or ideologies of particular groups who are plagued by this insidious form of social interaction.
Acting white is an equilibrium phenomenon; the consequence of two-audience signaling.
APPENDIX: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
This Appendix contains the formal arguments for the results in the text. The …rst two results con…rm some standard properties of equilibria to signaling games.
Lemma I: Fix an equilibrium and let ; 0 be any two types. Then: where s = ( ); s 0 = ( 0 ) and so forth. Substituting for u( ) from (3), we have,
Adding the inequalities and collecting terms gives,
Assume > 0 . Then setting = 0 in this inequality and recalling c s < 0 yields the …rst claim;
and setting = 0 and > 0 yields the second.
Lemma II: Consider any equilibrium and interval of types T such that ; 0 2 T implies = 0 and ( ( )) = ( ( 0 )). Then separating in on T implies ( ) > s c ( ) for all interior to T and 2 f0; 1g.
Proof. By hypothesis, is constant and ( ) is separating in for …xed . Hence, by Lemma I(I), ( ) is strictly monotonic increasing in on the relevant interval and, therefore, di¤erentiable almost everywhere. Consequently, local incentive compatibility implies du(!( ( 0 ; )); ; ( 0 ; ); )
Since is separating on T , !( ( ; )) = w(s; ) where s = ( ; ). Substituting and doing the calculus yields,
where the inequality follows from Lemma I. Under complete information, however, s c ( ) solves the …rst order condition, (5). Therefore, under complete information, the denominator of d =d is zero. But since this derivative is strictly positive under incomplete information and separating, it must be that ( ) > s c ( ). For all types ( ; h), de…ne ( ; h) = minfs( ); s c 1 ( ; h)g. By concavity of u, all types ( ; h) strictly prefer to be accepted withs( ) than rejected with s c 0 ( ) and, by construction, ( ; l) is indi¤erent between being rejected with s c 0 ( ) than accepted withs( ). Moreover, since ds( )=d > 0, ( ; h) is strictly increasing in .
It remains to check that, under D1, there is no pro…table deviation by any type ( ; ) to an education level s = 2 f ( ; h); s c 0 ( )g. In particular, it su¢ ces to check only that there is no pro…table deviation to some s 2 ( ( ; h); s c 0 ( )). Suppose ( ; h) = s c 1 ( ; h) and consider a deviation to some s 0 2 (s( ); s c 0 ( )). Then ( ; h) = s c 1 ( ; h) implies that ( ; h) is strictly worse o¤ for all beliefs of the group but, by de…nition ofs( ), ( ; l) strictly pro…ts from the deviation in the case that the group believes the deviant is a high social type and accepts the individual. Thus D1 requires the group believe the deviant is a low social type and rejects the individual, in which case ( ; l) strictly prefers s c 0 ( ) with the higher wage to the deviation s 0 . Now consider a deviation to some s 0 2 (s c 1 ( ; h);s( )). By de…nition ofs( ) and s c 1 ( ; h), respectively, both the low and high social types are strictly worse o¤ making the deviation to s 0 for all group beliefs. Therefore, no type has a pro…table deviation in this case.
Suppose ( ; h) =s( ). If an individual deviates to some s 0 2 (s c 1 ( ; h); s c 0 ( )) then a preceding argument applies and the group surely rejects the deviant. So consider a deviation to s 0 2 (s( ); s c 1 ( ; h)]. Then both types are strictly better o¤ conditional on group acceptance and strictly worse o¤ conditional on rejection. However, if the group believes either types is equally likely to have made the deviation and thus randomizes over whether to accept or reject the individual, (s 0 ) 2 (0; 1), the low type is willing to choose s 0 for a lower value of (s 0 ). Hence, D1 requires the group to believe the low type deviates to s 0 and therefore rejects the deviant. Thus no type has any incentive to deviate in this case, completing the proof.
Hereafter, assume both social type and economic type are private information. Proof of Proposition II, our main result, rests on several lemmata.
Lemma III: If is a D1 equilibrium strategy then is separating in on some interval [ ;^ ) and
Proof. Suppose ( ) is pooling in for all = ( ; ), 2 [ ; 1). Then p(h) <v implies every individual with economic type 2 [ ;^ ) is rejected by the group. However, if ( ; h) = ( ; l) = 0 then = ( ; l) can pro…tably deviate to education level s c 0 ( ) > 0: this individual is at worst rejected in either case and, since is the lowest possible economic type, his or her net income is surely higher with s c 0 ( ) than with no education. So assume ( ; h) = ( ; l) > 0 and, …rst, suppose there exists an interval of economic types [ ;^ ) with ( ; ) = ( ; l) for all and all 2 [ ;^ ); then, since is an equilibrium strategy,^ …nite and Lemma I imply lim #0 (^ + ; ) > ( ; l). Consider a deviation by = (^ ; ) to an education level s = ( ; l) + , for su¢ ciently small > 0. Given the maintained assumptions on payo¤s (3), D1 yields that both the …rms and the group believe the deviant's type is (^ ; l). To check this, suppose the group believes the deviant's social type is = l; then the individual is still rejected with the deviation and^ is uniquely the economic type who requires the lowest change in wage to make him or her indi¤erent between being rejected with the deviation and the candidate equilibrium payo¤ in which (^ ; ) is rejected by the group with education ( ; l); on the other hand, if the group believes the deviant's social type is = h then it accepts the individual and both (^ ; l) and (^ ; h) have a strict incentive to deviate to s. Thus (^ ; l) is the type most likely to defect from ( ; l) to s. Hence, cannot be pooling in 2 [ ;^ ) on ( ; l) > 0.
Because cannot be pooling in 2 [ ;^ ), ( ; ) > 0 implies that is separating in economic type on some interval [ ; 0 ]; without loss of generality, assume 0 =^ . If ( ; ) < s c 0 ( ) and is separating in on [ ;^ ), then is strictly increasing by Lemma I(I) and ( ; l) can improve his or her payo¤ by choosing s 0 = minfs c 0 ( ); (^ ; )g. Therefore, ( ; ) s c 0 ( ). But then, under the D1 re…nement, = ( ; h) can pro…tably deviate to education level s = 0. To see this, …rst note that ( ; h) strictly prefers to be accepted with s c 1 ( ; h) = 0 and zero income, to being rejected with ( ; h) > 0 and positive income. And second, given the deviation from ( ; h) to s = 0, under D1 the group surely believes the deviant is a high social type and so accepts him or her: from (8),
( ; l) prefers to separate in with education s c 0 ( ) to pooling in on s c 1 ( ; h) = 0. Since there are no other possibilities, this proves the lemma.
Lemma IV: Let ( ; ) be D1 equilibrium strategies. Let 1 and 0 , respectively, denote the restriction of to those types accepted and rejected by the group in the equilibrium. Then (I) 0 solves the di¤erential equation (9) with = 0 and initial condition lim # 0 ( ; ) = s c 0 ( ), where is the in…mal economic type rejected under ( ; );
(II) ( 1 ( ; h)) = 1 and ( 0 ( ; l)) = 0 implies 1 ( ; h) < 0 ( ; l).
Proof. (I) Since social type is irrelevant conditional on being rejected, rejected individuals face a classical costly signaling problem. Hence, (1) follows directly from Riley [1979] .
(II) By Lemma III, the claim is surely true for ( ; ). Suppose 1 ( ; h) 0 ( ; l) for some > . Then there exists 0 2 ( ; ] such that
However, incentive compatibility requires that for all > 0, Proof. Follows directly from Lemmas I, III and IV.
Recall that 1 and 0 , respectively, denote the equilibrium strategies of those accepted and rejected by the group in the equilibrium.
Lemma VI: Let ( ; ) be D1 equilibrium strategies such that, for some^ 2 ( ; 1) and all > 0, (^ ; l) 6 = (^ ; h) and (^ + ; l) = (^ + ; h). Then cannot be separating in at^ .
Proof. By Lemma IV(I), 0 is separating in and, by Lemma III, is separating in on some interval [ ;^ ). Suppose, contrary to the claim, that is separating in on [ ; 1). Since is presumed an equilibrium strategy and payo¤s are continuous in education for each 2 f0; 1g, if^ is …nite then the type (^ ; h) must be indi¤erent between choosing education 1 (^ ; h) and being accepted by the group, and choosing education 0 (^ ; h) and being rejected by the group. where the inequality follows from (4). Therefore, by continuity, there exists H 2 ( ; 1) such that 1 + h = u(!(ŝ); 1;ŝ; ( H ; h)) (13) = u(!( ( H ; h)); 0; ( H ; h); ( H ; h)) and, for all , 000 with < H < 000 , u(!( ( ; h)); 0; ( ; h); ( ; h)) < 1 + h < u(!( ( 000 ; h)); 0; ( 000 ; h); ( 000 ; h)):
Let be as described in the proposition with = 0 = L , 00 = 1 and^ = H de…ned by (13) .
Then the group's best response is to accept only those individuals with education s ( H ; h) =ŝ.
These strategies are supported as a D1 equilibrium by the group believing with probability one that any deviation to an education level s 2 (0; s c 0 ( )) is chosen by the type ( ; l) and best responding by rejecting the individual. This proves there exists a D1 equilibrium as required. Now supposeŝ > 0. Thenŝ <s( ), for otherwise the lowest rejected type, ( ; l), weakly prefers choosings( ) and being accepted to choosing s c 0 ( ) and being rejected. By Lemma III, ( ; h) = 0. There are two possibilities. First, there exists some 00 > strictly interior to the set of accepted economic types such that types in an interval ( ; 00 ) pool on an education level s, and types in an interval ( 00 ; 000 ) choose education levels strictly greater than s; that is, there exists 00 > and some > 0 such that, for all 2 (0; ), 0 ( 00 ; h) = s < lim # 00 ( ; h) ŝ:
But in this instance, D1 implies that any deviation to an education s 0 = s + , > 0 su¢ ciently small, induces both the group and the …rm to believe the deviant's type is = ( 00 ; h): since is interior to the accepted set of types, is uniquely the type who requires the lowest change in wage to make him or her indi¤erent between being accepted with education s 0 and the candidate equilibrium payo¤. Therefore such a deviation is strictly payo¤-improving to 00 and the equilibrium breaks down.
By Lemma VI, the remaining possibility is that ( ; h) is strictly increasing on an interval of accepted economic types such that 2 [ ; 0 ), 0 <^ ; and ( ; h) =ŝ for 2 [ 0 ;^ ). Then 1 is separating in on [ ; 0 ) in which case 1 must satisfy (9) with = h and initial condition 1 ( ; h) = s c 1 ( ; h) = 0; denote this strategy by 1 . By Lemma II, 1 ( ; h) > s c 1 ( ; h); hence, lim !1 1 ( ; h) = 1 > s c 0 ( ) >ŝ. Therefore,^ < 1, in which case there exists a D1 equilibrium withŝ > 0 if and only if there exists an education levelŝ <s( ) and …nite economic types H > L > such that: (14) u(!( 1 ( L ; h)); 1; 1 ( L ; h); ( L ; h)) = u(!(ŝ); 1;ŝ; ( L ; h));
(15) u(!(ŝ); 1;ŝ; ( H ; h)) = u(!( 0 ( H ; h)); 0; 0 ( H ; h); ( H ; h)) and (16)
Given suchŝ, H and L , let be as described in the proposition . Then the group's best response is to accept only those individuals with education s ( H ; h) =ŝ. These strategies are supported as a D1 equilibrium by the group (and …rms) believing with probability one that any deviation to an education level s 2 (ŝ; s c 0 ( )) is chosen by the type ( H ; l) and best responding by rejecting the individual; and believing with probability one that a deviation to an education level s 2
( 1 ( L ; h);ŝ) is chosen by ( L ; h) (sinceŝ <s( ), no low social type can pro…t by making such a deviation and, by de…nition of 1 and (14), no accepted type can pro…t either). This completes the proof.
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